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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
This matter comes on before this court on appeal from 
the district court's order entered December 14, 1998, 
granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Synthes 
(USA) ("Synthes" or "the company") dismissing appellant's 
complaint asserting claims under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. S 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and 
Pennsylvania common law. For the reasons we set forth 
herein, we will affirm the order of the district court. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
Synthes, which is in the business of manufacturing and 
distributing orthopedic and spinal implants and 
instrumentation, hired appellant Robert Shaner in 
September 1991 as a senior programmer/analyst in its 
information services department. In 1992, Synthes gave 
Shaner a six percent raise despite its practice of capping 
raises at five percent. 
 
In July 1992, Dick Jarvis joined Synthes and became 
Shaner's superior. In August 1992, Shaner was diagnosed 
with multiple sclerosis ("MS"). It is undisputed that Shaner 
did not disclose his ailment to the company until more than 
a year later, on November 15, 1993. 
 
In May 1993, Jarvis gave Shaner his first performance 
evaluation. The evaluation indicated that the "major 
problem" with Shaner was that he relied too heavily on 
quick "fix" solutions without locating underlying problems 
in the computer systems. It concluded that Shaner 
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"performs his duties as a Senior Programmer" but that he 
"has not demonstrated that he has the skills of a senior 
analyst."1 Shaner felt this evaluation was overly critical and 
he was unhappy with it. Thus, Shaner filed a complaint 
with the company regarding this evaluation. Shaner 
suspected that Jarvis did not like him, and it appeared to 
Shaner that the reason for the criticism was Jarvis's desire 
to get rid of programmers, such as himself, who had been 
with Synthes before Jarvis joined the company. 
 
On April 5, 1994, Jarvis gave Shaner another evaluation. 
This evaluation contained critical remarks similar to those 
in the prior evaluation.2 It indicated that Shaner was not 
proficient in identifying underlying problems in the 
computer systems and it concluded that Shaner "has not 
demonstrated [the] skills of a Senior Analyst." It further 
indicated that Shaner "displays a negative attitude about 
his job and does not seem happy with the job he performs." 
Shaner felt that this evaluation was "almost a carbon copy" 
of the 1993 evaluation. 
 
On April 13, 1994, Shaner filed a charge of disability 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ("EEOC") alleging that Synthes had denied him 
computer training in the area of "PC Applications."3 He 
claimed the company had promised him this form of 
training when he first began his employment and that the 
training had been given to other programmer/analysts. In 
January 1994, Shaner had sent a pointed email to Jarvis 
asking "[i]s there any reason I'm being excluded from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The evaluation rated Shaner's performance on a scale of 1 to 4, with 
4 being "superior," 3 being "above average," 2 being "average," and 1 
being "below average." Shaner received a 3 in the category of 
"assignments and results achieved," a 2.8 in"qualitative," and a 2.8 in 
"overall performance." 
 
2. In this evaluation, Shaner was graded "meets expectation" in the 
category of "assignments and results achieved" and "marginal" in the 
categories of "qualitative" and "overall performance." A "marginal" grade 
indicated that Shaner "does not consistently meet objectives." 
 
3. According to Shaner's brief, he first contacted the EEOC on March 30, 
1994. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Synthes became 
aware of Shaner's contact with the EEOC until after Shaner filed his 
charge on April 13, 1994. 
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EXCEL TRAINING4 when other programmers in this 
department have taken the training, with YOUR approval 
[?]" Jarvis sent a responsive email stating"[w]e have not 
offered Excel training to the AS/400 group [Shaner's group] 
at this time. You do not need Excel to perform your job." 
 
In the summer of 1994, Shaner went on a medical leave 
of absence for more than one month. Upon his return, the 
company lightened his work load during month-end closing 
procedures, which often required long hours on his part. 
Shaner welcomed this reduced work load. In addition, the 
company permitted him to miss work every Tuesday 
morning so he could attend an eleven a.m. water therapy 
class at a location which was over an hour's drive from the 
office.5 He continued to attend the water therapy class 
throughout his employment with Synthes. The company 
also permitted him to go home early when he was not 
feeling well. 
 
One of Shaner's principal allegations is that various 
employees, along with Jarvis, frequently turned up the heat 
in the office despite Shaner's requests that the office be 
kept cool; the excessive warmth allegedly exacerbated 
Shaner's MS symptoms. Shaner indicated in his deposition 
that the heat had been a problem for him even before 
November 1993, when he advised the company that he 
suffered from MS. In response to a complaint from Shaner, 
Mike DiGuglielmo, another of Shaner's superiors, emailed 
Shaner in May 1994 asking him to provide a doctor's note 
stating what working conditions were not good for his 
medical condition. Nevertheless, Shaner did not present the 
requested note from his doctor until November. The note 
was not specific as it merely indicated that the temperature 
in Shaner's work environment should be kept "on the low 
side." 
 
Shaner requested that a "lock box" be placed on the 
thermostat to prevent employees from repeatedly adjusting 
the office temperature. Although lock boxes were present on 
thermostats elsewhere in the building, the company did not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Excel training involved the operation of PC applications. 
 
5. Shaner was required to make up the missed time on other days. 
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place one in Shaner's work area. However, in November 
1994, the company relocated Shaner's office to a converted 
conference room which had its own thermostat so that he 
could control the temperature in his work space. 6 Shaner 
alleges that, on four or five occasions in 1995, an unknown 
individual or individuals covertly entered the conference 
room while Shaner was at lunch and turned the heat all 
the way up. On these occasions, Shaner returned from 
lunch and noticed that the room was overly warm, 
whereupon he adjusted the heat back down. 
 
In late 1994, DiGuglielmo told Shaner that it would be in 
his "best interest" to seek counseling through the 
company's employee assistance program. Shaner testified 
that "[f]or the most part" he had a negative attitude at this 
time, and he voluntarily agreed to attend counseling for 
assistance with his "work and health problems." The 
company permitted him to attend counseling sessions on 
its time and at its expense. According to Shaner, after he 
had attended several sessions, DiGuglielmo requested that 
he stop going to counseling, or at least that he stop going 
on company time. Shaner felt that this request was 
"inappropriate," inasmuch as DiGuglielmo had asked him 
to seek counseling in the first place. Shaner nevertheless 
continued to attend counseling during work hours because 
he felt that he was benefitting from it. 
 
DiGuglielmo prepared a performance evaluation of 
Shaner for the period ending March 15, 1995.7 According to 
this evaluation, Shaner "has shown a very negative attitude 
through out the last year" and he "has not performed to the 
level expected of a Sr. Program Analyst [and] his analytical 
skills are suspect." Further, the evaluation stated that 
Shaner "continues to point fingers at others and make 
excuses when things go wrong" and "[w]hen he is given 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The thermostat in this room also affected the temperature in other 
employees' nearby work areas, which somewhat limited Shaner's ability 
to control the temperature. 
 
7. In this evaluation, Shaner was graded "marginal" in the categories of 
"assignments and results achieved" and "overall performance," and 
"below expectations" in the category of "qualitative." "Below 
expectations" 
 
indicated that Shaner "frequently does not meet objectives." 
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assignments he complains about them and they drag out 
longer than they should." 
 
On April 19, 1995, Shaner again went on leave for 
medical reasons and his condition has prevented him from 
ever returning to work. Synthes notified Shaner by letter 
dated October 5, 1995, that it was terminating his 
employment effective October 19, 1995, "in accordance with 
our company policy of terminating employment after six 
months of medical leave of absence." The letter advised 
Shaner that he could "reapply" for employment should his 
condition improve. Shaner has been totally and 
permanently disabled since he left Synthes in April 1995. 
 
On April 17, 1996, Shaner filed a second EEOC charge 
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and 
retaliation for the filing of his first EEOC charge. In this 
second charge, Shaner alleged that he was "harassed" in 
several respects. He complained about the heat being 
turned up in the office, and he indicated that he had 
"received a poor review" in April 1994. He stated that 
"[a]round the end of 1994, I was told by Mike DiGuglielmo 
that I had to go to counselling [sic] because I had a `bad 
attitude.' " He claimed that he was "harassed to the point 
that my disability was aggravated," which forced him to go 
on disability and ultimately led to his termination. 
 
Shaner filed this action in the district court on June 23, 
1997. Count I of the complaint alleged disparate treatment 
on account of disability in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 
SS 12111-12117, "as evidenced by, inter alia, (a) [ ] sudden 
change in [the company's] performance evaluations of 
plaintiff, after being informed of plaintiff 's diagnosis of 
Multiple Sclerosis . . . ; (b) refusing to allow[plaintiff] the 
special training necessary to the successful completion of 
his work, while allowing it to other employees;[and] (c) 
engaging in harassment of plaintiff including the 
manipulation of the room temperature of his workplace 
with the knowledge that such behavior would cause 
plaintiff serious illness or total disability." Count II alleged 
retaliation in violation of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. S 12203, "as 
evidenced by, inter alia, (a) [ ] harassment of plaintiff, 
including turning up the heat in the office so as to cause 
exacerbation of plaintiff 's condition; (b) transferring 
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plaintiff to a converted closet when he complained about 
the manipulation of the heat; (c) making false accusations 
of poor performance by plaintiff; (d) requiring plaintiff to 
undertake counseling from a third party provider which 
was harassing and unnecessary; and (e) terminating 
plaintiff 's employment while he was out on that medical 
leave." Count III alleged intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Following the company's motion for summary 
judgment, the district court dismissed all claims in an 
order dated December 11, 1998, and entered on December 
14, 1998. Shaner filed a notice of appeal from the district 
court's order. 
 
II. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Shaner's ADA claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331 and 
supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claim pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1291. Our standard of review is plenary. See 
Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 305 (3d Cir. 
1999). "Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and 
affidavits show there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Jones v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 
F.3d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1999). We must view the record in 
the light most favorable to Shaner and draw all reasonable 
inferences in his favor. Id. 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. ADA Claims 
 
In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
treatment under the ADA, a plaintiff must show "(1) he is 
a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the 
job, with or without reasonable accommodations by the 
employer; and (3) he has suffered an otherwise adverse 
employment decision as a result of discrimination." Gaul v. 
Lucent Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998); see 
also Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 142 (3d Cir. 
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1998) (en banc) (citing Gaul). To establish a prima facie 
case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must show "(1) 
protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the 
employer either after or contemporaneous with the 
employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection 
between the employee's protected activity and the 
employer's adverse action." Krouse v. American Sterilizer 
Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
We have indicated that the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 
1817 (1973), applies to ADA disparate treatment and 
retaliation claims. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of 
Southeastern Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667-68 (3d Cir. 1999); 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500-01; Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, 
Inc., 60 F.3d 153, 156-58 (3d Cir. 1995). We recently have 
described the McDonnell Douglas framework as follows: 
 
       Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas analysis 
       proceeds in three stages. First, the plaintiff must 
       establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the 
       plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, 
       the burden shifts to the defendant `to articulate some 
       legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's 
       rejection.' [McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 
       S.Ct. at 1824.] Finally, should the defendant carry this 
       burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to 
       prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
       legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its 
       true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See 
       Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 
       248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (citations 
       omitted). While the burden of production may shift, 
       `[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact 
       that the defendant intentionally discriminated against 
       the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.' Id. 
       Our experience is that most cases turn on the third 
       stage, i.e., can the plaintiff establish pretext. 
 
Jones, 198 F.3d at 410. 
 
We have stated as follows with regard to the application 
of the third step of the McDonnell Douglas framework at the 
summary judgment stage: 
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        At this point, the court focuses on whether there is 
       sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude 
       that the purported reasons for defendant's adverse 
       employment actions were in actuality a pretext for 
       intentional race [or disability] discrimination. At trial, 
       the plaintiff must convince the finder of fact`both that 
       the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 
       real reason.' St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 
       502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (emphasis in 
       original). The factfinder's rejection of the employer's 
       proffered reason allows, but does not compel, judgment 
       for the plaintiff. Sheridan [v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours 
       and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1066-67 (3d Cir. 1996) (en 
       banc)]. 
 
        On numerous occasions, we have explained the 
       plaintiff 's burden at summary judgment on this aspect 
       of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework. 
       Specifically, in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 
       1994), and later in Sheridan, we stated that a plaintiff 
       may defeat a motion for summary judgment (or 
       judgment as a matter of law) by pointing `to some 
       evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a 
       factfinder would reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the 
       employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe 
       that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely 
       than not a motivating or determinative cause of the 
       employer's action.' Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan, 
       100 F.3d at 1067. 
 
Id. at 412-13.8 "To discredit the employer's proffered 
reason, [ ] the plaintiff cannot simply show that the 
employer's decision was wrong or mistaken . . . . Rather, 
the non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such 
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, 
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We recently have made clear that a plaintiff 's ultimate burden in a 
retaliation case is to convince the factfinder that retaliatory intent had 
a 
"determinative effect" on the employer's decision. See Woodson v. Scott 
Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 931-35 (3d Cir. 1997); Krouse, 126 F.3d at 501 
("The plaintiff must prove that retaliatory animus played a role in the 
employer's decisionmaking process and that it had a determinative effect 
on the outcome of that process.") (citing Woodson). 
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legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 
could rationally find them unworthy of credence, and hence 
infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non- 
discriminatory reasons." Fuentes v. Perskie , 32 F.3d 759, 
765 (3d Cir. 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
According to Shaner's complaint, the company's violation 
of the ADA was "evidenced by" several forms of improper 
conduct--the denial of training, the poor performance 
evaluations, the manipulation of office temperature, the 
relocation of his office, the request that he attend 
counseling, and the termination. It is unclear from the 
complaint whether Shaner is claiming that each of these 
forms of conduct constitute separate "adverse employment 
actions"--and thus constitute separate substantive ADA 
claims--or whether he is alleging some of them simply as 
proof of discriminatory or retaliatory intent. Synthes 
contends that the only substantive ADA claims properly 
preserved through a timely EEOC charge were the 
discriminatory denial of PC applications training (which 
Shaner raised in his first EEOC charge) and the retaliatory 
termination (which he raised in the second). According to 
Synthes, Shaner conceded in the district court that he was 
not pursuing any other allegations as substantive ADA 
claims. The district court assumed that Shaner primarily 
was challenging the denial of PC applications training and 
the termination, and treated the other alleged conduct as 
merely evidence of improper intent. Shaner's briefing on 
this appeal does not clarify the matter; his reply brief 
simply refers to all of the alleged improper conduct as 
"evidence" of discrimination or retaliation. 
 
We will not determine which of Shaner's allegations were 
properly preserved through a timely EEOC charge, nor will 
we dwell on whether Shaner seeks to pursue each of his 
various allegations as separate substantive ADA claims. 
Rather, we conclude, considering all of Shaner's allegations, 
that there is not sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable 
factfinder to conclude that the company acted with 
discriminatory or retaliatory intent with respect to any of 
the challenged conduct. More specifically, with respect to 
the disparate treatment claim, we hold that Shaner has not 
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presented enough evidence to permit a factfinder either to 
disbelieve the company's articulated reasons, or to conclude 
that discrimination on account of disability was the real 
reason for any of the alleged improper actions. With respect 
to Shaner's retaliation claim, we hold that Shaner has not 
presented sufficient evidence to establish a causal 
connection between any of the alleged improper actions and 
the filing of his first EEOC charge. Moreover, even 
assuming a prima facie case of retaliation could be 
established, we conclude that Shaner has not presented 
sufficient evidence to permit a factfinder either to disbelieve 
the company's reasons, or to conclude that retaliation was 
the real reason, for any of the alleged improper actions. 
 
Like many (if not most) employment discrimination 
plaintiffs, Shaner has no direct evidence to indicate that 
anyone at Synthes exhibited hostility towards him based on 
his protected status (as a disabled person) or his protected 
activity (the filing of his first EEOC charge). The following 
exchanges from Shaner's deposition are illustrative: 
 
       Q. From the time you filed the [first EEOC] charge 
       until you left Synthes, did anyone at Synthes, any 
       manager at Synthes, including . . . Mike [DiGuglielmo] 
       and Dick Jarvis, say anything to you about the charge 
       you had filed with the EEOC in April of 1994? 
 
       A. I don't remember. 
 
       Q. Can you identify any conversation or any 
       statement that you heard about that charge made by 
       any of those people at this time? 
 
       A. No, I cannot. 
 
       Q. Did anyone report to you that any Synthes 
       manager, including . . . Dick Jarvis or Mike, had made 
       any statement regarding the EEOC charge that you 
       had filed in April of 1994 from April 1st, 1994 until the 
       time you left Synthes? 
 
       A. I can't remember. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Q. [ ] Do you have any information that Synthes or 
       any of its managers were retaliating against you 
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       because you filed an EEOC charge in April of 1994 at 
       any time that you were employed at Synthes? 
 
       A. Do I have any information? No. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Q. Can you identify any fact or tell me about any 
       information or any evidence you have which would 
       indicate to you, in any way, that any manager of 
       Synthes, at any time, retaliated against you because 
       you filed an EEOC charge in April of 1994? 
 
       A. I don't remember any at this time. 
 
       . . . . 
 
       Q. Did you ever hear any comments made by any 
       Synthes manager, including . . . Dick Jarvis or Mike or 
       any other manager, that indicated that you were 
       discriminated against because of your disability or your 
       alleged disability? 
 
       A. No. 
 
       Q. Did anyone report to you any comments by any 
       member of Synthes management which indicated that 
       you were discriminated against because of your 
       disability or alleged disability? 
 
       A. I can't remember any, no. 
 
App. at 78, 82. 
 
Of course, direct evidence of intent is not required to 
establish a discrimination claim. See Pivirotto v. Innovative 
Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999). In the 
absence of direct evidence, a plaintiff may rely on 
circumstantial evidence to "demonstrate such weaknesses, 
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 
contradictions" in the employer's proffered legitimate 
reasons so as to permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that 
the employer did not act for the proffered reasons. See 
Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764-65. Accordingly, we will examine in 
detail the various instances of improper conduct Shaner 
alleges to determine whether he possibly can show such 
weaknesses or implausibilities. We conclude that he 
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cannot, and thus his ADA claims cannot survive a motion 
for summary judgment.9 
 
1. Denial of training 
 
Shaner claims that, upon his commencing employment 
with Synthes, the company promised him that he would 
receive PC applications training. According to Shaner, he 
was told that "every opportunity would be available" for 
such training, and the company's "extensive PC network" 
was one of the reasons he chose to accept a job at Synthes. 
Shaner never received the PC applications training he 
desired, despite his requests for it. He claims that other 
similarly situated workers received this type of training, 
including Vincent Jasinnas, who received training in July 
1993 on Excel. 
 The company contends that PC applications and Excel 
were not necessary for Shaner to perform his job. Shaner's 
testimony fails to counter the company's contention, and 
indeed tends to support it. At his deposition, Shaner 
speculated that training in PC applications or Excel 
"possibly" might have been helpful to him--for example, if 
a user asked him a question related to PC applications -- 
but he gave no testimony indicating that training in these 
areas was germane to his regular job functions. Indeed, 
Shaner answered "No" when asked whether he needed 
Excel in order to do his job as of January 1994, when he 
and Jarvis exchanged emails regarding Excel training. 
Further, Shaner indicated during his deposition that he did 
not know whether Jasinnas, who received Excel training, 
actually was doing work involving the use of Excel. Perhaps 
most significantly, Shaner's testimony shows that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. We have indicated that "a discrimination analysis must concentrate 
not on individual incidents, but on the overall scenario." See Woodson, 
109 F.3d at 921 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, where, as here, a 
plaintiff alleges that discrimination or retaliation is evidenced by 
discrete 
categories of conduct, we believe that some examination of each category 
is necessary in order to assess the merits of the case. See id. We will 
examine each of the categories of improper conduct alleged by Shaner, 
keeping in mind our admonition that "[a] play cannot be understood on 
the basis of some of its scenes but only on its entire performance." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
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denial of PC applications and Excel training began before 
November 1993, when he first advised the company of his 
MS. Accordingly, we can see no basis for a reasonable jury 
to conclude that Shaner was denied PC applications or 
Excel training on account of his disability.10 
 
Further, there is no evidence of a discriminatory denial of 
training on the J.D. Edwards system. Shaner's testimony 
indicates that he received a week-long training seminar on 
J.D. Edwards in April 1994, along with other Synthes 
programmers.11 In January 1995, Shaner was instructed to 
spend four to five hours per week with J.D. Edwards on his 
own in order to become comfortable with the system. 
Manuals for J.D. Edwards were available, which Shaner 
read and understood, and Shaner was advised that he 
should seek help from another employee who was proficient 
with the system. Shaner tried to comply with the company's 
instruction, but he found the system difficult to learn, 
although he was a computer professional. Shaner never 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 10. According to Shaner's brief, "the record revealed that all the 
programmers except Shaner had received PC Applications training, 
causing even the other programmers to wonder why plaintiff was being 
excluded." We do not see any support in the record for this contention. 
Shaner's brief cites only to the testimony of a Synthes employee, Crystal 
Dean. However, Dean was referring not to PC Applications training but 
to another form of training--on a system called J.D. Edwards--when she 
testified that Shaner was denied training that others had received. 
("[Shaner] was the last of the programmers who had not received training 
for J.D. Edwards.") (emphasis added). Yet, Shaner conceded at his 
deposition that he received a week of J.D. Edwards training along with 
other programmers, and Dean testified that she was unaware that 
Shaner had received this training. Indeed, Dean conceded that she had 
no personal knowledge as to the J.D. Edwards training received by any 
of the programmers, including Shaner, and she indicated that her 
knowledge regarding denials of training was based almost entirely on 
what Shaner had told her. Accordingly, Dean's testimony does not 
provide a basis for inferring discriminatory intent in relation to the 
denial of PC applications training, or any other form of training. 
 
11. Shaner also contends that he wrongfully was excluded from meetings 
of the "SIBIS" team, which was involved in programming the J.D. 
Edwards system. Yet, Shaner testified that his exclusion from the SIBIS 
team began when Jarvis joined the company, which was well before 
Shaner disclosed his illness to the company in November 1993. 
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asked anyone for help, because he felt it would be 
"humiliating" to do so, and he never indicated to anyone 
that he could not or would not learn the system on his 
own. He admitted in his deposition that he simply failed to 
carry out his superiors' expectation that he familiarize 
himself with J.D. Edwards. As with PC applications 
training, we see no grounds for a reasonable jury to 
conclude that the company acted with discriminatory intent 
with respect to its decision not to provide Shaner with 
additional formal training on J.D. Edwards.12 
 
2. Performance evaluations 
 
Shaner's allegation that there was a "sudden change" in 
his performance evaluations after he informed the company 
that he suffered from MS is not supported, and indeed is 
contradicted, by the record evidence. Shaner's May 1993 
performance evaluation--which Shaner himself viewed to be 
highly critical--was given several months before he 
informed Synthes about his disease and nearly a year 
before he filed his first EEOC charge. According to Shaner's 
testimony, he suspected at the time that the motive behind 
the criticisms in the 1993 evaluation was Jarvis's desire to 
force out programmers who pre-dated Jarvis's arrival at 
Synthes. While this motive may not have been benevolent, 
it could not have been based on Shaner's disability, which 
had not yet been made known to the company. According 
to Shaner's testimony, his next evaluation, in April 1994-- 
which he received prior to the filing of his first EEOC 
charge, was a "carbon copy" of the 1993 evaluation. A 
subsequent evaluation in March 1995, like the two prior 
ones, indicated that Shaner was not performing to the level 
expected of a senior analyst. In short, the record shows 
that Shaner's performance evaluations contained similar 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. Our conclusions regarding PC applications training and J.D. 
Edwards training are further bolstered by Shaner's testimony that the 
company in fact provided him with various training during the course of 
his employment, including the week-long seminar on J.D. Edwards. 
Further, the company paid for Shaner to attend periodic seminars with 
an organization called the "Delaware Valley Computer Users Group." The 
fact that Shaner received some training from the company severely 
undermines his claim that the company deprived him of other forms of 
training on account of his disability. 
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criticisms both before and after he made the company 
aware that he suffered from MS and before and after he 
filed his first EEOC charge.13 
 
Under these circumstances, there is simply no evidence 
that any of these evaluations was causally linked to the 
filing of Shaner's first EEOC charge or that any of them was 
motivated by discriminatory or retaliatory intent. We have 
indicated that temporal proximity between the employee's 
protected activity and the alleged retaliatory action may 
satisfy the causal link element of a prima facie retaliation 
claim, at least where the timing is "unusually suggestive of 
retaliatory motive." See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503 (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920. Yet 
the timing of the performance evaluations in this case is 
anything but suggestive, inasmuch as Shaner received the 
1993 and 1994 evaluations prior to the filing of his first 
EEOC charge, and the 1995 evaluation was prepared nearly 
a year after the filing of the charge. 
 
Moreover, although "mere passage of time is not legally 
conclusive proof against retaliation," we have indicated that 
the passage of a long period of time between protected 
activity and an alleged retaliatory action weighs against a 
finding of a causal link where there is no evidence of 
retaliatory animus during the intervening period. See 
Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503-04 ("Absent evidence of intervening 
antagonism or retaliatory animus, we conclude that the 
passage of time [between the filing of plaintiff 's charge and 
the alleged retaliatory action] in this case is conclusive and 
that [plaintiff] failed to establish a causal link as a matter 
of law."); Woodson, 109 F.3d at 920-21. The record does not 
support a finding that there was an intervening retaliatory 
animus so as to establish a causal connection between the 
filing of Shaner's first charge and the 1995 evaluation, 
particularly in view of the circumstance that the three 
evaluations were consistent. 
 
We also make the following observation with respect to 
performance evaluations. While it is possible that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Indeed, prior to November 15, 1993, Shaner complained to his MS 
support group that he had received an unfairly critical performance 
review from his employer. 
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manager might make a poor evaluation to retaliate against 
an employee for making an EEOC charge, still it is 
important that an employer not be dissuaded from making 
what he believes is an appropriate evaluation by a reason 
of a fear that the evaluated employee will charge that the 
evaluation was retaliatory. In this regard, we are well aware 
that some employees do not recognize their deficiencies and 
thus erroneously may attribute negative evaluations to an 
employer's prejudice. Accordingly, in a case like this in 
which the circumstances simply cannot support an 
inference that the evaluations were related to the EEOC 
charges, a court should not hesitate to say so. 
 
3. Office temperature 
 
According to Shaner's testimony, prior to the relocation of 
his office, he frequently saw employees, including Jarvis, 
adjusting the thermostat in the area of the building where 
Shaner and others worked. He admitted during his 
deposition that he had no evidence that any of these people 
were changing the thermostat in order to harm him. 
Indeed, he responded "I would think so" when asked 
whether these people were adjusting the thermostat simply 
because they were uncomfortable with the office 
temperature, and he indicated that he "disagreed" with 
others regarding the appropriate temperature.14 Most 
significantly, Shaner testified that the thermostat frequently 
was adjusted too high for his liking prior to November 1993, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Shaner's testimony in this regard is corroborated by testimony from 
other Synthes employees. Denise Arms-Sadowski testified that she had 
a low tolerance for cold temperatures and often asked Jarvis to raise the 
heat. She also testified that there were other employees who complained 
about the office being too cold. According to George Felix, "Bob [Shaner] 
would go to the thermostat and turn the heat down. There were 
employees that complained that it was then too cold in the office and 
they would turn the heat back up." Indeed, at oral argument before us, 
Shaner's counsel stated that "it is clear from the evidence on the record 
that they were raising the heat to over 75 degrees for the comfort level 
of 
 
other employees." Oral Argument Tr. at 7 (emphasis added). Of course, 
we do not suggest that this case turns on an inquiry as to how far an 
employer must go to make a reasonable accommodation under the ADA 
to a disabled person at the expense of other employees. See Kralik v. 
Durbin, 130 F.3d 76, 80-84 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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when he first informed the company that he suffered from 
MS. Thus, with respect to the period prior to the relocation 
of Shaner's office, we see no basis for a finding that anyone 
adjusted the temperature with discriminatory or retaliatory 
intent, and no evidence of a causal link between Shaner's 
problems with office temperature and the filing of his first 
EEOC charge.15 
 
According to Shaner, after his office was relocated, there 
were four or five instances when an unknown individual or 
individuals turned the heat all the way up while he was at 
lunch. These isolated incidents do not in themselves rise to 
the level of adverse action upon which to base a claim for 
disparate treatment or retaliation. See Mondzelewski v. 
Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3d Cir. 1998) 
("[M]inor or trivial actions that merely make an employee 
`unhappy' are not sufficient to qualify as retaliation under 
the ADA . . . ."). Even if a factfinder could infer that these 
incidents were motivated by hostility toward Shaner's 
disability, we do not believe, in light of all the evidence, that 
these incidents provide a basis for a rational finding that 
any of the company's other actions were motivated by 
discriminatory or retaliatory intent.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. We do not see how an intent to discriminate or retaliate can be 
inferred from the fact that Shaner was required to work under the same 
temperature conditions as other employees. 
 
16. Shaner's claim that the company acted with retaliatory intent in 
relocating his office is entirely without merit. The company was 
responding to Shaner's own complaints about office temperature, and 
Shaner conceded at his deposition that the company"attempted to 
accommodate me" by moving him to a room with its own temperature 
control. Indeed, according to Shaner's testimony, he and DiGuglielmo 
agreed prior to the move that it would be better for him to work in an 
area where he could control the temperature. Further, Shaner's 
allegation that the conference room to which he was moved was a 
"converted closet" is completely at odds with his own deposition 
testimony. Although the conference room was once used for storage, it 
also had been an office for two consultants, and it contained windows 
looking out onto a hallway. We simply see no basis for a finding that the 
office relocation was causally linked to the filing of the EEOC charge or 
that the relocation was made with retaliatory intent. 
 
We also see no evidence of retaliatory intent with respect to 
DiGuglielmo's request that Shaner attend counseling. Shaner voluntarily 
 
                                18 
 
 
4. Termination 
 
Shaner does not challenge the company's general policy 
requiring termination of employees who are on medical 
leave for six months. Nor does he dispute that he was 
permanently and totally disabled when he went on leave in 
April 1995 and that he has been unable to work since. 
Shaner's argument is that the company intentionally or 
recklessly caused an exacerbation of his MS through its 
discriminatory and retaliatory treatment--including the 
manipulation of the office temperature--so as to compel 
him to take a leave of absence, thereby allowing the 
company to apply its termination policy as a pretext for 
retaliation.17 To support this argument, Shaner cites his 
own hearsay testimony that another employee told him that 
the company began removing and rearranging things in 
Shaner's office a day or two after Shaner went on leave in 
April 1995. Shaner contends that the company did not 
know at that time how long he was going to be absent. 
 
We have no trouble concluding that a reasonable 
factfinder cannot accept Shaner's theory that the company 
intentionally or recklessly caused his MS to worsen. 
Contrary to the inference which Shaner seeks to raise, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
attended the counseling because he felt that it would be beneficial to 
him. As with the relocation of Shaner's office, the evidence shows only 
that the company was making efforts to help Shaner, rather than to 
discriminate or retaliate against him. The very purpose of the ADA would 
be undermined if, in the context presented here, we were to view the 
company's attempts to aid or accommodate Shaner as evidence of 
retaliatory treatment. 
 
17. Shaner's brief argues as follows: 
 
       Focusing entirely on Synthes's `non-discriminatory reason' for 
firing 
       Robert Shaner (Synthes's alleged policy of firing any employee out 
       on medical leave for more than six months), the court below 
       accepted Synthes's statements that they always adhered to the six 
       month policy, disallowing that Shaner need not have offered 
       evidence challenging the existence of such a policy, since he was 
       charging that Synthes had caused his disability so that it could 
       apply the policy to him. The punctilious procedural perfection of 
       Synthes's use of that policy is irrelevant. 
 
Appellant's Br. at 37-38. 
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evidence shows that the company made substantial efforts 
to accommodate him. When Shaner returned from hisfirst 
leave of absence in 1994, the company lightened his 
month-end work load and allowed him to attend water 
therapy sessions during work hours. In November 1994, 
the company moved him to an office with its own 
thermostat so that he could control the temperature in his 
work space. The company also permitted him to leave work 
early when he was ill and allowed him to attend counseling 
sessions during work hours. Considering all the evidence, 
there is no basis for a factfinder to conclude that the six- 
month policy was applied as a pretext for retaliation. 
 
Further, the evidence does not establish a causal link 
between the termination and the filing of Shaner'sfirst 
EEOC charge. The termination took place approximately a 
year and a half after the filing of the charge, and the 
evidence does not support a finding that there was such 
intervening discrimination or retaliatory harassment as to 
permit an inference that the termination was linked to the 
filing of the charge. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503-04 
(affirming summary judgment for employer on retaliation 
claim where there was no evidence of antagonism or 
retaliatory animus during nineteen-month period between 
the filing of the plaintiff 's charge and the alleged retaliatory 
action). Although Shaner contends that the company 
planned on firing him as soon as he began his leave in April 
1995, the fact remains that he was not fired until six 
months later, pursuant to a neutral policy. There is no 
basis for a finding of retaliation here. In sum, the district 
court properly granted summary judgment with respect to 
Shaner's ADA claims. 
 
B. Emotional Distress 
 
We further conclude that there is not sufficient evidence 
to establish a claim for intentional infliction of emotional 
distress under Pennsylvania law. That tort is defined as 
follows: 
 
       One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
       intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional 
       distress to another is subject to liability for such 
       emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other 
       results from it, for such bodily harm. 
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Hoy v. Angelone, 720 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 1998) (quoting 
Restatement (Second) of Torts S 46).18 "[C]ourts have been 
chary to allow recovery for a claim of intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Only if conduct which is extreme or 
clearly outrageous is established will a claim be proven." Id. 
at 753-54. The Hoy court rejected an emotional distress 
claim arising from workplace sexual harassment involving 
sexual propositions, physical contact with the plaintiff 's 
knee, off-color jokes, regular use of profanity, and the 
posting of a sexually suggestive picture. See id. at 754-55. 
In so ruling, the court stated that "the conduct exhibited 
. . ., while unacceptable, was not so extremely outrageous 
. . . that would allow for recovery under this most limited 
of torts." Id. at 755. 
 
We will assume that conduct which is intended to cause 
a worsening of a disabled person's physical symptoms may 
qualify as "extreme or clearly outrageous." Nevertheless, 
viewing the record in the light most favorable to Shaner, we 
do not find sufficient evidence to establish such a claim 
here. Shaner's most serious allegation--manipulation of the 
office temperature with intent to cause him harm or 
reckless disregard for his health--is simply not supported 
by the record, which indicates that others adjusted the 
temperature simply for their own comfort.19 Accordingly, 
Shaner's emotional distress claim cannot survive summary 
judgment.20 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not expressly adopted section 
46 of the Restatement. See Hoy, 720 A.2d at 753 n.10. In Hoy, the court 
assumed the existence of the tort under Pennsylvania law and concluded 
that the plaintiff had failed to establish a right of recovery. See id. 
 
19. Although Shaner testified as to four orfive occasions when someone 
turned the heat all the way up in the conference room while he was at 
lunch, we do not believe that these isolated incidents rise to the level 
of 
 
outrageous conduct, even assuming that the perpetrator was aware of 
the effect of heat on Shaner's MS. Such isolated office pranks do not 
meet the threshold of this "most limited of torts." See Hoy, 720 A.2d at 
755. 
 
20. The district court held that Shaner's emotional distress claim was 
barred by the Pennsylvania Workers' Compensation Act, and further 
indicated that any heat-related aggravation of Shaner's MS would be a 
work-related injury compensable only through workers' compensation. In 
light of our disposition, we need not address these issues. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's order 
entered December 14, 1998, granting summary judgment 
in favor of Synthes will be affirmed. 
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